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FREE AT LAST? THE CONTRACTUAL THEORY OF THE 
CORPORATION AND THE NEW MARYLAND 
OFFICER-DIRECfOR LIABILITY PROVISIONS 
Henry N. Butlert and Larry E. Ribsteintt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the most significant debate in corporation law today con-
cerns the extent to which corporations and their shareholders should be 
free to order internal corporate relations, in particular the fiduciary du-
ties of officers and directors. One view is that the corporation is a set of 
private contractual relationships and, as such, should be no less amena-
ble to private ordering than other contracts.' The competing view holds 
that the corporation differs fundamentally from a conventional contract 
and, as such, should be subject to mandatory rules. 2 This latter, or anti-
contractualist, position derives in part from the now outmoded original 
view of the corporation as a creation or concession of the state. 3 
The debate on the nature of the corporation has been brought to a 
head by a number of recent developments, particularly the explosion in 
takeover activity4 and the so-called "crisis" in director liability insur-
ance. 5 The latter development has spurred state legislatures to enact one 
or both of two different types of corporation law provisions. 6 The first 
t B.A., 1977, University of Richmond; M.A., 1979, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University; Ph.D., Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State Uni-
versity; J.D., 1982, University of Miami School of Law; Associate Professor of Law, 
Director of the Law & Economics Center, George Mason University. 
tt B.A., 1968, The Johns Hopkins University; J.D., 1972, University of Chicago 
School of Law; Professor of Law, George Mason University. 
l. See, e.g., R. HESSEN, IN DEFENSE OF THE CORPORATION (1979); Fischel, The Cor-
porate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982); Butler & Ribstein, 
Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Con tractarians, (forthcoming 
WASH. L. REV. (1990)). 
2. For statements of the anti-contractarian position, see Brudney, Corporate Govern-
ance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); 
Coffee, No Exit?: Opting Out, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the 
Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 919 (1988). 
3. For an attack on the continued relevance of the concession theory of the corpora-
tion to modern corporation law, see Butler & Ribstein, State Anti-Takeover Statutes 
and the Contract Clause, 57 U. CJN. L. REv. 611 (1988) [hereinafter Butler & Rib-
stein, Anti-Takeover Statutes]. 
4. /d. at 647-55 (relating the contract theory of the corporation to state anti-takeover 
statutes). 
5. There is a widespread impression that such a crisis exists without addressing the 
serious question of whether there is a real crisis in director liability insurance. For 
an analysis of the problems in the director liability insurance market, see ROMANO, 
WHAT WENT WRONG WITH DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' LIABILITY INSURANCE? 
(Working Paper No.7l, Yale Law School, Program in Civil Liability, Jan. 1988). 
6. For discussions of these statutes, see Hazen, Corporate Directors' Accountability: 
The Race to the Bottom-The Second Lap, 66 N.C.L. REV. I-'ll (1987); Gelb, Direc-
tor Due Care Liability: An Assessment of the New Statutes, 61 TEMPLE L. Q. l3 
(1988). 
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type of provision explicitly authorizes corporations to adopt by share-
holder vote charter provisions limiting director liability.? The second 
type of provision changes the liability rules by legislative fiat without ac-
tion by the shareholders. 8 Maryland has recently added both types of 
provisions. 9 
The director liability crisis and the statutes that have been enacted 
to resolve it present a perfect opportunity to demonstrate both the 
strengths of a coherent contractual theory of the corporation and the 
operation of such a theory in practice. The liability crisis, if there is one, 
may have occurred because the parties to corporations have not been 
given free rein in drafting their managerial contracts. Offering more con-
tractual freedom to shareholders, therefore, will go a long way toward 
solving the director liability problem. But state legislatures should learn 
a lesson from this crisis and fully accept the implications of the contrac-
tual theory. Because the new Maryland provisions, like similar provi-
sions in other states, do not fully accept the implications of the 
contractual theory, they raise significant practical and theoretical 
problems. 
This article examines the recent Maryland statutory changes from 
the perspective of the contractual theory of the corporation. In general, 
it discusses how the two types of provisions adopted in Maryland raise 
different types of concerns under the contractual theory of the corpora-
tion. Part II briefly outlines the contractual theory of the corporation 
and its implications for contracting in and out of fiduciary duties. Part 
III discusses the new Maryland shareholder option provision and dem-
onstrates that this type of provision is consistent with the contract theory 
except to the extent that it limits the shareholders' options. Part IV ex-
amines the new Maryland indemnification provision which raises serious 
concerns both under the contract theory and the Contract Clause of the 
United States Constitution because it amounts to a retroactive change 
in the shareholders' contract. Finally, Part V offers concluding 
observations. 
II. THE CONTRACTUAL THEORY OF THE CORPORATION 
The contractual theory of the corporation is a positive economic ap-
proach to corporate law that is strongly supported by current economic 
theory. The contractual theory describes the corporation as a nexus of 
7. See, e.g., Mo. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN.§§ 2-104(b)(8), 2-405.2 (1985 & Supp. 
1988). 
8. This category includes both expansion of indemnification power as in§ 2-418 of the 
Corporations and Associations article of the Maryland Annotated Code and limits 
on officer and director liability as in the new Virginia statute. See Mo. CORPS. & 
Ass'Ns CooE ANN. § 2-418 (Supp. 1988); 1987 Va. Acts ch. 257 (amending VA. 
CODE ANN. § l3.1-692.1(B) (1989)). For a discussion of the latter provision, see 
Honabach, All That Glitters: A Critique of the Revised Virginia Stock Corporation 
Act, 12 J. CORP. L. 433, 472-79 (1987). 
9. See supra notes 7-8. 
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voluntary contracts rather than a set of mandatory legal rules. Under 
the contractual theory of the corporation, corporation decisional rules 
and statutory laws are merely standard form contracts. The normative 
implication is that the parties should be able to contract around statutory 
law. 
Much of the theoretical work supporting the contractual view of the 
corporation refutes a seminal 1932 work by Berle and Means. 10 Berle 
and Means argued that managers of large, dispersed-owner corporations 
have effective control over their corporations' assets and, therefore, can 
divert these assets to further their own interests at the expense of the 
shareholders. 11 The normative implication of the Berle and Means cri-
tique of the modern corporation is that legal regulation is necessary to 
constrain the agency cost inherent in the "separation of ownership and 
control." 12 
The economic theory refuting Berle and Means shows that the par-
ties to a corporation, as well as to other types of contracts, can choose 
among a wide variety of devices to minimize the organizational costs of 
doing business. Some of these devices rely on the operation of markets to 
reduce agency costs while others rely on judicial enforcement. If the par-
ties are permitted to order their own affairs, optimal organizational forms 
will develop. In other words, as Professors Fama and Jensen have said, 
"[a]bsentfiat, the form of organization that survives in an activity is the 
one that delivers the product demanded by customers at the lowest price 
while covering costs."' 3 
The parties can reduce agency costs resulting from the separation of 
ownership and control by monitoring managers, adjusting managers' in-
centives so that their interests are aligned with those of the shareholders, 
or by "bonding" managers to ensure that acts contrary to shareholder 
interests will be costly to the managers. But these activities can be costly. 
For example, close monitoring of managers can reduce their ability to 
exercise their expertise on behalf of the shareholders. Consistent with 
Fama and Jensen's general view of the corporate market, managers and 
shareholders will adopt monitoring, incentive and bonding devices up to 
the point where the marginal cost of such additional activities exceeds 
the marginal reduction in agency loss they cause. 14 
lO. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
(1948). 
11. /d. at 119-25. 
12. /d. at 4. 
13. Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & EcoN. 301, 301 
(1983) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership]. 
14. See Jensen & Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ANAL 305 (1976). Jensen and Meckling 
define "agency cost" as comprising monitoring and bonding expenses and the 
agency loss remaining even after monitoring or bonding is in place. /d. at 309. For 
purposes of this article, "agency cost" is used in its more conventional meaning to 
refer only to residual agency loss. 
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Several examples demonstrate this general theory in operation. The 
corporate parties can reduce the agency cost inherent in the publicly held 
firm by the simple expedient of doing business in closely held firms where 
there is much less separation of ownership and control. But the parties 
would then forego the many benefits of the public, or "open" form of 
ownership, including diversification of risk, specialization of capital-rais-
ing and managerial functions, and development of an efficient market in 
the firm's shares. 15 Thus, the very selection of the public form of owner-
ship represents a trade-off of agency cost against the costs of closer moni-
toring in light of the circumstances of the particular business. 
Within the publicly held firm, many devices exist for reducing 
agency costs. Perhaps most importantly, the shareholders have voting 
rights that can be aggregated by a bidder for control, who can reap gains 
in the value of their stock by improving management. This "market for 
corporate control," through the threat of displacing inept or disloyal 
managers, gives managers the incentive to maximize shareholders' re-
tums.16 Also, the development of the board of directors as a long-range 
planning and policy group17 provides the corporation with an effective 
monitoring body. 18 Effective monitoring can also be provided by large 
shareholders19 and outside auditors.20 In addition, executive compensa-
tion can be structured to reduce conflicts between investors and manag-
ers and to signal that total agency costs are optimized.21 There also is a 
market for managerial services both within the firm and between firms 
whereby managers compete with one another for pay and promotions on 
the basis of their productivity.22 No one mix of governance mechanisms 
15. See Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership, supra note 13; Fama & Jensen, Orga-
nizational Forms and Investment Decisions, 14 J. FIN. EcoN. 101 (1985) [hereinafter 
Fama & Jensen, Organizational Forms]. 
16. See Mann, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. PoL. EcoN. 110 
( 1965). For a recent review of the considerable evidence supporting the importance 
of the market for corporate control, see Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, The Market for 
Corporate Control: The Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. EcoN. PERSP. 49 (1988). 
17. See A. CHANDLER, STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE- CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY 
OF INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE (1962); 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERAR-
CHIES (1975); Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes, 
19 J. EcON. LIT. 1537 (1981). 
18. See Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership, supra note 13, at 313-15. 
19. See Demsetz & Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Conse-
quences, 93 J. POL. EcoN. 1155 (1985). For a study showing that corporations with 
different ownership structures tend to incorporate in different states on the basis of 
their differing needs for other monitoring devices, see Baysinger & Butler, Corporate 
Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board 
Composition, 1 J. L., EcoN. & ORGAN. 101 (1985). 
20. See Watts & Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Auditors, and the Theory of the Firm: 
Some Evidence, 26 J. L. & EcoN. (1983). 
21. See Diamond & Verrechia, Optimum Managerial Contracts and Equilibrium Secur-
ity Prices, 37 J. FIN. 275 (1982). 
22. See Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. PoL. EcoN. 660 
(1980); Faith, Higgins & Tollison, Managerial Rents and Outside Recruitment in the 
Coasian Firm, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 660 (1984). 
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is universally optimal because corporations face different constraints 
such as capital., requirements, product market competition and 
regulation. 23 
The above discussion has emphasized non-judicial mechanisms for 
ensuring that managers act in the shareholders' interests. But there is 
also a place in economic theory and in the coutractual view of the corpo-
ration for judicially enforced fiduciary duties. Ex ante constraints on fi-
duciary conduct often do not operate perfectly, so that ex post settling up 
through liability rules may sometimes be appropriate to fill gaps left by 
non-judicial mechanisms.24 Among the most important reasons for the 
concept of fiduciary duties is that in long-term contracts it is costly to 
anticipate and draft for every contingency. This condition of "bounded 
rationality"25 forces the parties to rely on alternatives such as standard 
form good faith or fiduciary duty terms provided by judicial decisions 
and statutory provisions. 26 
Although fiduciary duties may sometimes be useful in filling gaps 
left by extra-judicial constraints on management misconduct, it is a seri-
ous mistake to assume that the parties to a corporate contract would 
view such duties as a panacea to be applied whenever gaps exist because 
the costs of judicially enforced fiduciary duties may far exceed the bene-
fits in terms of constraining managerial conduct. First, fiduciary duties 
may result in imposing substantial costs on managers who, unlike the 
shareholders, are unable to reduce the risk by diversification and are 
therefore relatively inefficient risk-bearers. 27 As a result, liability may 
even exacerbate agency costs, as managers are induced to manage more 
conservatively than the shareholders would prefer. Second, derivative 
litigation imposes indirect costs, such as demands on managers' time and 
interference with valuable long-term relations between the managers and 
the corporation.28 Finally, there are potentially significant error costs as 
courts substitute their judgments for those of the business experts on the 
board.29 
Even if judicially enforced liability is appropriate, the derivative suit 
23. For a study linking these factors with variations in ownership structure, see Dem-
setz & Lehn, supra note 19. 
24. See Davis, Judicial Review of Fiduciary Decisionmaking - Some Theoretical Per-
spectives, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. I (1985). 
25. The term originated in H. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 198 (1957). 
26. See Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good 
Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 371 (1980); Davis, supra note 24; Goetz & Scott, 
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089, 1092-93 (1981). 
27. This point has been recognized even by anti-contractarians. See, e.g., Coffee, supra 
note 2, at 947. 
28. See Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corpo-
rate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 268-70 
(1986). 
29. For a criticism of the application of judicial proceduralism to the managerial deci-
sionmaking process, see Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's 
Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477 (1984). 
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mechanism for fixing such liability is suspect. The derivative suit mecha-
nism takes the discretion to decide what corporate litigation is appropri-
ate out of the hands of corporate management and places it to some 
extent in the hands of a single shareholder or, more accurately, the plain-
tiff's counsel. As has often been noted by a leading anti-contractarian, 
the interests of plaintiff's counsel, like those of the managers, are imper-
fectly aligned with those of the shareholders. 30 The result of the deriva-
tive process can result in a case like Polk v. Good, 31 a greenmail case that 
finally concluded with a settlement establishing noncontroversial voting 
procedures and providing for disclosure of plaintiffs' discovery material 
in exchange for $700,000 in fees for plaintiff's attomey.32 It is not be-
yond the realm of probability that shareholders would want to limit such 
suits. 
In light of the potential costs of fiduciary duties, the optimal con-
tract in some situations may be a mix of fiduciary duties and extrajudicial 
enforcement devices. For example, review of transactions by outside di-
rectors may be a less costly method of reducing agency cost than impos-
ing fiduciary duties on directors. It may be necessary to trade off the two 
approaches at the margin as stricter liability reduces outsiders' willing-
ness to serve. Similarly, it may be efficient to substitute shareholder vot-
ing for director liability on economically significant transactions. This 
would free directors to exercise their judgment in recommending transac-
tions without fear of liability, while screening potentially harmful trans-
actions by shareholder voting. Again, at the margin, director liability is 
traded off for shareholder monitoring. 
The anti-contractarians mistakenly assume that if some of a device 
is good for some companies, more is better for every company. Conse-
quently, they argue that all companies should have independent boards33 
and the managers of all companies should be subjected to a federally 
mandated minimum standard of conduct. 34 Conversely, they argue that 
if an extrajudicial device does not achieve perfect results, fiduciary duties 
must be added to the mix even if the combined cost is not offset by the 
resulting reduction in agency loss. 35 These arguments, however, ignore 
30. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic 
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
CoLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986); Coffee, The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as 
Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1985); Coffee, 
Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty 
Hunter is Not Working, 42 Mo. L. REV. 215 (1983). 
31. 507 A.2d 531 (Del. 1986). 
32. /d. at 535. 
33. See Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: 
Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 375, 404 (1975). 
34. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 
663 (1974). 
35. For an example of this type of analysis focusing on imperfections in incentive com-
pensation of managers, see Coffee, supra note 2, at 943-45. 
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the need for trade-offs in structuring optimal corporate governance 
contracts. 
The only way to identify the proper balance of corporate governance 
mechanisms for any particular corporation is through private ordering 
under truly enabling corporate statutes. First, the parties to the corpo-
rate contract, who bear all of the costs, have adequate incentives to fash-
ion efficient rules. As Professor Coffee has said,. "the case for private 
ordering is that the parties can recognize their own self-interest more 
quickly than the courts."36 Moreover, legislative and judicial rules do 
not respond as well as private ordering to individual situations and 
changing conditions.37 Finally, political agents, like corporate agents, 
are subject to private incentives that may cause them to act contrary to 
the interests of their constituents. 38 • 
Ironically, the "crisis" which provoked the recent Maryland 
director and officer liability provisions probably resulted from applica-
tion of the anti-contractualist view of corporate law. In Smith v. Van 
Gorkum,39 the case that is widely credited with spawning the crisis in 
directors' liability insurance and statutory responses like that in Mary-
land, 40 the court held that both outside and inside directors had violated 
their duty of due care in recommending a merger. The defendants settled 
for $23.5 million, only part of which was covered by insurance. The lia-
bility crisis that followed this decision was simply a statement by corpo-
rations that this liability was more costly than it was woqh. In other 
words, corporations preferred to rely on monitoring by such governance 
mechanisms as outside directors or shareholder voting rather than pay 
the costs of director liability.41 The court's error would not have been so 
bad if corporations had been permitted to draft around this decision. But 
it took the current wave of statutory fixes to accomplish this seemingly 
innocuous result. 
Economic theory thus provides credible support for the proposition 
that optimal corporate arrangements are far more likely to be achieved 
through private ordering than through mandatory legal rules. Neverthe-
less, anti-contractarians argue that mandatory legal rules are necessary 
36. /d. at 931. 
37. See Baysinger & Butler, Revolution v. Evolution in Corporate Law: The ALI's Pro-
ject and the Independent Director, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 557 (1984). 
38. A recent illustration of this problem is state anti-takeover statutes. See Butler, Cor-
poration-Specific Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Market for Corporate Law, 1988 
Wis. L. REv. 365; Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. 
REV. Ill (1987). 
39. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
40. See REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON DIRECTOR LIABILITY, MARYLAND STATE 
BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION ON CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW, 
COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LAWS 5-7 (Nov. 16, 1987) [hereinafter DIRECTOR 
LIABILITY REPORT], reprinted in 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 254, 255-57 (1989) 
(Appendix). 
41. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text. 
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because true private ordering is impossible, particularly . in public 
corporations. 
With a nod to Berle and Means,42 the anti-contractarians allege that 
arrangements within the public corporation are essentially adhesion con-
tracts imposed by corporate managers on dispersed, ignorant sharehold-
ers.43 But corporate contracts, even in the public corporation, are plainly 
not adhesion contracts. A public corporation competes for investment 
dollars with thousands of other corporations and thousands more of non-
corporate investment vehicles, such as partnerships,. franchise contracts 
and certificates of deposit. Even shareholders who are already in a cor-
poration that proposes a revision of the contract can choose whether to 
vote for, vote against, abstain, sell their stock or mount a takeover bid or 
proxy contest. Nor is it significant that public corporation shareholders 
do not individually negotiate governance arrangements. The fact that 
most governance arrangements are set forth in non-negotiated standard 
forms is not a cause for concern, but rather increases efficiency by reduc-
ing transaction costs. 
Even the lack of shareholder consent to individual terms presents no 
problem for the contract theory of the corporation.44 The fact that a 
shareholder chooses to pay a certain price for a bundle of rights and 
obligations without incurring the substantial costs of understanding each 
term of the contract is no more troublesome than the fact that an auto-
mobile buyer pays several thousand dollars for an automobile without 
having the slightest idea how a carburetor works. 
The relevant question is not whether the corporate contract is one of 
adhesion - plainly it is not - but whether markets adequately protect 
shareholders from entering into improvident contracts. The absence of 
individualized consent and negotiation are immaterial because public 
corporation shareholders are protected by the efficiency of the securities 
markets, a fact about which there now can be little doubt.45 Because of 
the work of securities analysts and other information disseminators, all 
public information concerning a company, including the terms of con-
tracts constraining managerial discretion, is -efficiently reflected in securi-
ties prices. Thus, shareholders buying into a governance arrangement 
42. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. 
43. See Brudney, supra note 2, at 1406; Sargent, Two Cheers for the Maryland Director 
and Officer Liability Statute, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 278, 300-01 n. 99, (1989). Pro-
fessor Sargent is able to dismiss the contract theory of the corporation on this 
ground in less than a paragraph. 
44. For this reason, the extensive discussion of consent in Honabach, Consent, Exit, and 
the Contract Model of the Corporation-A Commentary on Maryland's New Director 
and Officer Liability Limiting and Indemnification Legislation, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 
310, 331-46 (1989), misses the mark. 
45. Professor Michael Jensen, a leading efficient market theorist, has said that "there is 
no other proposition in economics which has more empirical evidence supporting it 
than the efficient markets hypothesis." Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regard-
ing Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. EcoN. 95, 96 (1978). 
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get what they pay for even if they do not have any idea what they are 
getting. 
Efficient pricing of contract terms protects shareholders and assures 
that resources will be allocated to efficient arrangements. It also gives 
managers incentives to develop more efficient arrangements or risk being 
ousted by someone who can reap a profit by buying control and improv-
ing the contract. Shareholders are similarly protected by efficient securi-
ties markets when they vote to approve changes in governance 
arrangements. Even if most shareholders do not know what they are 
voting on, an inefficient proposal provides an arbitrage opportunity for 
someone who can purchase voting shares and defeat the proposal. 
The contract view of the corporation is not only supported by per-
suasive economic theory; it is also not refuted by the consent-based con-
cerns of the anti-contractarians. In fact, so weak are the anti-
contractarians' arguments that it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 
they ultimately rest on history rather than on logic. The corporate form 
was born as a concession of state power rather than as the product of 
private contract.46 Nearly a century of incorporation under primarily 
enabling, general incorporation laws apparently has not fully erased the 
marks of this ancestry from the modern corporation. 
III. MARYLAND'S CHARTER OPTION PROVISION 
Maryland has enacted two types of provisions intended to deal with 
the director liability "crisis." The first, discussed in this part, permits the 
shareholders to adopt a corporate charter provision expanding or limit-
ing the damage liability of officers or directors except where they receive 
an "improper benefit or profit in money, property or services" or engage 
in "active and deliberate dishonesty" that is material to a judgment ad-
verse to the director or officer.47 The second provision, expanding direc-
tors' and officers' indemnification rights, is discussed in Part IV. 
The Maryland charter option provision is based on a similar new 
provision in the Delaware code.48 However, the Delaware provision ap-
plies only to directors and provides for broader limitations on the share-
holders' opt-out power than the Maryland statute. In particular, 
shareholders under the Delaware statute may not eliminate director lia-
bility "[t]or any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corpora-
tion or its stockholders" or "[f]or acts or omissions not in good faith or 
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law."49 
Because the Maryland charter option provision permits the share-
holders to decide to some extent the terms of the corporate contract, it is 
generally consistent with the contract theory of the corporation. 50 The 
46. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. 
47. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 2-104(b)(8), 2-405.2 (Supp. 1988). 
48. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988). 
49. /d. § 102(b)(7)(i),(ii). 
SO. There are two respects in which the charter option statute, by offering too much 
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provision is vastly superior in this respect to the bill originally proposed 
by the Subcommittee on Director Liability, which would have imposed a 
self-executing change in the liability standard on all Maryland corpora-
tions. 51 The statute is also superior to the Delaware charter option pro-
vision because it permits the shareholders to limit the liability of both 
directors and officers, 52 and to do so as to a broader range of conduct 
than is covered by the Delaware statute. 53 
As discussed in Part II, under the contract theory of the corpora-
tion, the shareholders should be able to decide all of the terms of their 
contract. 54 Because management discretion can be constrained both by 
liability rules and by extrajudicial mechanisms, and because both ap-
proaches yield varying costs and benefits in different situations, optimal 
contracts can evolve only through private ordering. Thus, the sharehold-
ers could rationally decide that fiduciary duty liability in a particular 
setting would lead to sub-optimal decision-making by managers. The 
shareholders' choices are either bargained out directly, as in a close cor-
poration, or constrained by the efficient securities markets. 
Professor Sargent is, then, clearly incorrect when he criticizes the 
Maryland statute for ignoring the traditional distinction between the 
duty of care and the duty of loyalty. 55 To begin with, that distinction is 
subject to considerable dispute. 56 On one hand, under agency theory, all 
shareholder choice, may be inconsistent with the contract theory of the corporation. 
First, if the shareholders can be said to have contracted for a limitation on the 
power of a majority of the shareholders to alter managerial liability, the charter 
option statute might constitute a retroactive alteration of that contract. See Butler 
& Ribstein, The Contract Clause and the Corporation (forthcoming BROOKLYN L. 
REV. (1989)). For a discussion of the retroactivity problem, see infra notes 72-73. 
The shareholders might want such a limitation to protect against opportunistic con-
duct by majority shareholders. However, it is questionable whether the statute can 
be read to provide for such a contract given the shareholders' broad amendment 
power, and the shareholders' power to reincorporate under statutes providing differ-
ent contractual terms. 
Second, the statute, by covering managers' liabilities to the "corporation," may 
unjustifiably permit the shareholders to control the terms of liabilities for the benefit 
of creditors as well as for excessive dividend distribution. 
51. See DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT, supra note 40, at l-3, 7-10, reprinted in 18 U. 
BALT. L. REV. at 254-55, 257-58 (discussing the proposed bill as well as the reasons 
for shifting to the charter option approach). 
52. Compare DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § l02(b)(7) (Supp. 1988) with MD. CORPS. & 
Ass'NS ConE ANN. § 2-405.2(a) (Supp. 1988). It is not clear whether§ 2-405.2 of 
the Corporations and Associations article of the Maryland Annotated Code, which 
permits "any provision expanding or limiting the liability of its directors and of-
ficers" permits the shareholders to limit the liability of either officers or directors but 
not both. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.2(a) (Supp. 1988) (emphasis 
supplied). 
53. Compare DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988) with Mo. CORPS. & 
Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.2(a) (Supp. 1988). 
54. See supra notes 13-45 and accompanying text. 
55. See Sargent, supra note 43, at 300-01. 
56. For a criticism of the care/loyalty distinction, see Fischel & Bradley, supra note 28, 
at 290-91. For commentary on the Fischel-Bradley position, see Scott, The Role of 
Preconceptions in Policy Analysis in Law: A Response to Fischel and Bradley, 71 
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agency costs arise from divergence between the interests of the agent and 
the interests of the shareholders. Thus, even inattention to duty by the 
agent is a "disloyal" use of the agent's time to benefit himself rather than 
his principal. On the other hand, perhaps negligence is better monitored 
by extrajudicial monitoring devices like the market for control, while 
most breaches of the duty of loyalty are readily observable by courts. 
In the final analysis, however, whether a distinction between the 
duty of care and the duty of loyalty is theoretically appropriate is com-
pletely irrelevant to whether the shareholders of a particular corporation 
should be compelled to include such a distinction in their contract. Even 
if it is accepted that the highly controversial conclusion that the distinc-
tion is workable and appropriate in many cases, this at most justifies 
making such a provision part of a statutory standard form that the share-
holders can contract around. It does not justify limiting the sharehold-
ers' choice. 
There is, in fact, good reason to believe that ·some shareholders 
would choose to opt out of liability for the duty of loyalty if given the 
opportunity. The problem is that while the care/loyalty distinction may 
be workable in many cases, it is hazy at the borders. For example, any 
takeover defense may involve a breach of the duty of loyalty if the man-
agers are regarded as self-interestedly clinging to their jobs. Thus, liabil-
ity for breach of the duty of loyalty may shift to the managers the cost of 
erroneous takeover defenses, making the managers less willing to engage 
in such defenses than the shareholders would prefer. The shareholders of 
a particular firm may therefore conclude that liability for breach of the 
duty of loyalty is excessively costly in this respectY Of course, the 
shareholders of other firms may reach different conclusions. Because 
shareholder preference for takeover defense varies among firms, no single 
statutory approach is optimal for all firms. 58 
A limitation on the shareholders' power to contract can be logically 
justified only by imperfections in the market's ability to constrain ineffi-
cient contract terms. The efficiency of the securities markets makes any 
such justification quite doubtful in this context. 59 But even if there were 
such a justification, there is no reason to believe that it would tum on the 
CORNELL L. REV. 299 (1986); Goetz, A Verdict on Corporate Liability Rules and 
the Derivative Suit: Not Proven, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 344, 350-51 (1986); Demsetz, 
A Commentary on Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law, 71 COR-
NELL L. REv. 352, 355-56; Edited Transcript of Proceedings of the Business Round-
table/Emory University Law and Economics Center Conference on Remedies Under 
the ALI Proposals: Law and Economics, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 357, 367-71 (1986). 
57. Even if the shareholders carve out a liability exclusion for takeover defenses, a statu-
tory restriction on loyalty-duty limitations creates uncertainty about the enforce-
ability of such an exclusion, thereby making it impossible for the shareholders to 
eliminate the manager risk aversion problem. 
58. See Baysinger & Butler, Antitakeover Amendments, Managerial Entrenchment and 
the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 71 VA. L. REV. 1257 (1985); Ribstein, 
An Applied Theory of Limited Partnership, 37 EMORY L.J. 837 (1988). 
59. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. 
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care/loyalty distinction. If markets adequately discipline contracts 
around the duty of care, there is absolutely no reason to suspect that they 
do not operate equally well regarding contracts around the duty of 
loyalty. 
The Maryland statute therefore appropriately avoids the care/loy-
alty distinction. The principal issue regarding the charter option provi-
sion from the standpoint of the contract theory of the corporation is not 
whether the statute is too broad, but whether it inappropriately limits 
shareholder choice. The most important limitations are those prohibit-
ing liability exclusion for "improper benefit" and "active and deliberate 
dishonesty," and the restriction of the scope of the statute to provisions 
relating to liability "for money damages. "60 
The conduct exclusions do not present serious problems under the 
contract theory of the corporation because they arguably protect rather 
than limit shareholder choice. As to the "improper benefit" clause, it is 
significant that the shareholders can exclude liability for self-enriching 
conduct by managers if this conduct is not "improper." As long as the 
shareholders can define by contract what is "improper," this exclusion 
protects the shareholders from unconstrained unilateral abrogation of 
the contract by the managers. The only problem with this exclusion is 
that "improper" may have a broader meaning. The provision, therefore, 
should be redrafted to eliminate this ambiguity. 
The exclusion for "active and deliberate dishonesty" also can be in-
terpreted as preserving shareholder choice by ensuring that the share-
holders are kept informed by their agents. Here too, the problem is 
ambiguity and potential overbreadth. The statute refers to managerial 
acts or omissions that are "the result of active and deliberate dishonesty." 
While this may refer only to corporate acts that are effectuated by means 
of misrepresentation or nondisclosure, as where a shareholder vote is 
procured by dishonesty, it may also refer more broadly to bad faith moti-
vation of the agent. This broader reading comes dangerously close to 
preserving liability for breach of the duty of loyalty. Again, the statute 
should be clarified. 
A more serious problem under the contract theory of the corpora-
tion is that the statute does not permit the shareholders to opt out of 
managerial duties liability, but rather only out of money damage liability 
for breach of these duties. Thus, the shareholders may not preclude suit 
for injunctive or prophylactic relief. Yet there are strong reasons why 
the shareholder would choose to opt out of these consequences as well. 
Suits for injunctive relief may cause considerable damage to the corpora-
60. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.2(a) (Supp. 1988). Another limitation 
that bears examination from a contract perspective is that the statute applies only to 
liability by persons in their capacity as officers and directors. See id. § 2-405.2(c). 
The shareholders may have strong reasons for wanting to adjust the liability of em-
ployees and other corporate actors. 
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tion by delaying or preventing valuable transactions.61 Thus, the costs of 
this remedy may greatly outweigh the benefits in light of the availability 
of other monitoring devices. 
The statute's limitations on shareholder choice are mitigated to 
some extent by the availability of the reincorporation option. To the ex-
tent that the parties to a corporate contract can avoid limitations on opt-
ing out by incorporating under another state's statute, there are no truly 
mandatory state provisions. 62 This has given rise to a debate between 
contractarians and anti-contractarians as to whether the competition for 
corporate charters makes corporate law too permissive. 63 
Largely ignored in the debate over the state competition for charter-
ing business is whether the chartering market sufficiently overcomes limi-
tations on shareholder choice in individual corporation statutes. In fact, 
reincorporation to escape mandatory rules is often a costly option. For 
example, it has been argued that Delaware is in a position to offer a 
uniquely stable corporation law because the state in effect bonds share-
holders against opportunistic law changes through its dependence on 
corporation business. 64 Shareholders may have to trade off the costs of 
restrictions on contracting in Delaware for benefits of incorporating in 
Delaware. Also, as Professor Honabach points out, close corporations 
may be foreclosed from reincorporating by the costs of having to operate 
in their home state as a foreign corporation.65 The latter problem is par-
ticularly serious because mandatory provisions make the least sense in 
close corporations, where direct bargaining among the parties is feasi-
ble.66 For these reasons, mandatory provisions are inconsistent with the 
contract theory of the corporation despite the theoretical availability of 
the reincorporation option. 
In conclusion, the Maryland charter option provision is consistent 
with the contract theory of the corporation except to the extent that the 
conduct limitations on opt-out may be interpreted as operating more 
broadly than merely protecting the shareholders' contract and the statute 
prohibits opt-out from non-monetary liability. Subject to these caveats, 
61. See Gimble v. Signal Companies, Inc., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 316 A.2d 619 
(Del. 1974) (the court, recognizing this problem, imposed a $25 million bond as a 
condition of enjoining the sale of a subsidiary). 
62. See Honabach, supra note 42, at 336-37. 
63. The leading works on each side of the debate are Cary, supra note 34 (lamenting 
Delaware's role in the so-called "race to the bottom" of corporate standards) and R. 
WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978) (arguing that state com-
petition for corporate charters operates for the benefit of shareholders because it is 
constrained by efficient capital markets). 
64. See Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L., 
ECON., & ORGAN. 225 (1985). 
65. See Honabach, supra note 44, at 344-45. 
66. These costs of reincorporating permit the states to charge rents to corporations, part 
of which are appropriated by powerful interest groups within the state, particularly 
lawyers. See Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corpo-
ration Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987). 
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the provision is clearly a commendable step toward complete recognition 
of private ordering in the corporation. 
IV. THE INDEMNIFICATION PROVISION 
As an additional reaction to the director liability crisis, the Mary-
land legislature amended the statutory provisions governing indemnifica-
tion of officers and directors. 67 The most important changes permit the 
corporation68 to enlarge the range of indemnifiable acts to include acts 
other than those proved to be in bad faith or the result of "active and 
deliberate dishonesty" or involving receipt of "improper personal bene-
fit" or reasonable cause to believe that the act was unlawful; to permit 
indemnification of amounts paid in settlement of derivative suits; and to 
provide that the indemnification provided for in the statute is not exclu-
sive of any other rights provided for by corporate act.69 
To the extent that the indemnification changes enlarge the share-
holders' ability to opt out of liability, the changes are an appropriate step 
toward private ordering. But, unlike the charter option provision, the 
indemnification changes present serious problems under the contract the-
ory of the corporation. 
First, the statute seriously limits shareholder options by not permit-
ting the shareholders to provide for more limited indemnification than 
what is specified in the statute. Although the statute arguably can be 
read as permissive rather than mandatory, the nonexclusivity subsection 
seems clearly to provide only for expansion of managers' rights of indem-
nification and not for limitation of those rights. 70 
Second, and most importantly, the indemnification changes are 
thrust on the corporation without shareholder vote. Although the stat-
ute does not mandate indemnification in any particular case, it clearly 
permits the board to provide for indemnification that was not available 
before the changes.71 This state-decreed change72 in the corporate con-
tract not only is inconsistent with the contractual theory of the corpora-
tion, but there is a strong argument that it violates the Contract Clause of 
the United States Constitution.73 
67. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-418 (1985 & Supp. 1988). 
66. Note that unlike such statutes as § 145 of Title 8 of the Delaware Code Annotated, 
the Maryland statute does not specify how the corporate decision must be made. 
Compare DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1983 & Supp. 1988) with MD. CORPS. & 
Ass'Ns CoDE ANN. § 2-418 (1985 & Supp. 1988). 
69. MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CoDE ANN. § 2-418 (1985 & Supp. 1988). 
70. /d. § 2-418(g) (Supp. 1988). 
71. See supra text acompanying note 69. 
72. Professor Honabach suggests that changes. decreed by the shareholders are also sus-
pect. See Honabach, supra note 44, at 324. However, a shareholder amendment 
right is part of the contract. 
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No state shall ... pass any . . . Law impairing the 
obligations of contracts .... "). See Butler & Ribstein, Anti-Takeover Statutes, supra 
note 3. 
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The only possible justification for this impairment of the corporate 
contract is that it saves the shareholders the transaction cost of making a 
change in their contract that they would clearly favor. 74 This is a highly 
questionable argument. It is not clear that shareholders would generally 
prefer such a change. While, as discussed in Part III, the shareholders 
may have ample reason to want to limit managers' liability, they also 
may favor inclusion of liability rules in the mix of contractual mecha-
nisms for reducing agency loss. Moreover, the shareholders' preference 
for liability rules will vary from firm to firm, so that there is little justifi-
cation for an across-the-board change in all corporate contracts within 
the state. In any event, there is little reason to make a legislative "guess" 
that the shareholders would want the change where the transaction costs 
of private ordering are so low. A change in indemnification rights will 
undoubtedly be proposed by management because it is in their interests, 
and could be approved by the shareholders at little cost through a vote at 
an annual meeting. 
The abrogation of the shareholders' contract is not "saved" by the 
fact that the shareholders can always avoid the change by reincorporat-
ing outside Maryland or by selling their shares. 75 The reincorporation 
option is costly, particularly since managers would oppose reincorpora-
tion to escape indemnification, so that the shareholders could 
reincorporate only by overcoming the free-rider problem that afflicts dis-
persed owners. Even if reincorporation is practicable, the shareholders' 
contract has been changed to the extent that avoidance of the indemnifi-
cation provision has imposed the cost of reincorporation upon the share-
holders. If the contract has been changed, it is no answer that the 
shareholders can escape the change by selling their shares. A change 
which negatively impacts the company will be reflected in the sale price 
of the shares. 76 Thus, sale only capitalizes, and does not permit escape 
74. See Honabach, supra note 44, at 345. Even if this argument made sense under the 
contractual theory of the corporation, it is not clear it would pass constitutional 
muster as a ·~reasonable and necessary" impairment under the Contract Clause. See 
Butler & Ribstein, Anti-Takeover Statutes, supra note 3, at 635-42. 
75. See Honabach, supra note 44. 
76. It is no answer to this problem that the shareholders hold diversified portfolios. See 
Honabach, supra note 44, at 342. While diversification reduces the variance in ex-
pected returns of the shareholders' investments, it clearly does not prevent reduc-
tions in expected portfolio returns as a result of state changes in the corporate 
contract, any more than it completely shields shareholders from injury from mana-
gerial misconduct. 
Professor Honabach would permit the state to make "routine," as distin-
guished from "fundamental," changes in the corporate contract, and would classify 
as routine any change the possibility of which was discounted in stock price. !d. at 
340-41. However, because the future is never fully reflected in stock price, and be-
cause the whole purpose of changes in the corporation law is to adjust to new devel-
opments, it would be impossible to distinguish between these types of changes. 
Moreover, even if the distinction was possible as to one time period, it would be 
hopelessly complicated by the fact that different shareholders bought at different 
times. 
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from, the change in the contract. 
It is curious that although the Maryland legislature refused to im-
pose reductions in directors' liability on corporate contracts, 77 it was 
willing to impose changes in indemnification, which is itself a form of 
reduction in liability. Did the legislature simply fail to make the connec-
tion between the two types of provisions? It is worth noting that one 
difference between increasing indemnification and reducing liability is 
that attorneys' fees are generated only in the former case. This difference 
is consistent with the story that lawyers are the most important interest 
group in shaping corporate law.78 Assuming this explanation is plausi-
ble, it points up the fact that even if private ordering sometimes leads to 
an imperfect result, the alternative - government regulation of the terms 
of corporate contracts - is not completely untainted. 
·V. CONCLUSION 
The new Maryland provisions on manager liability present two com-
pletely different stories in terms of the contract theory of corporate law. 
The charter option provision is an important step toward a more com-
plete recognition of private ordering in the corporation. The principal 
problem with this provision is simply that it does not go far enough. The 
legislature should complete the journey it started by clarifying and nar-
rowing the exceptions to opting out of liability. 
The changes to the indemnification statute are another story. 
Although these changes to some extent broaden the shareholders' op-
tions regarding indemnification, it is more important that at the same 
time they abrogate the shareholders' existing contracts by forcing more 
liberal indemnification on all Maryland corporations. This type of tam-
pering with the corporate contract is unlikely to have the effect sought by 
the legislature of encouraging corporations to remain in Maryland. In-
stead, shareholders may well bid down the price of shares in Maryland 
corporations to reflect the risk of future tampering. 
The contractual theory of the corporation is not only supported by 
economic theory, but itself provides a valuable tool for analyzing and 
evaluating corporate law. As state legislatures become more attuned to 
thinking of the corporation as a contract, corporate law inevitably will 
become more coherent. Moreover, as the law enhances private ordering, 
corporate contracts will become more efficient. 
n: See supra notes 47-66. 
78. See Macey and Miller, supra note 66, at 502-06. 
